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Appellants, Dimicks, pursuant to Rules 24, 26 and 27 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, reply as follows:
INTRODUCTION
Appellee's answering brief (1) confradicts its position in the trial court by
now arguing that causation was an issue below; (2) misrepresents the record below
by arguing that Dimicks did not identify specific defects in the subject product for
the trial court; and (3) materially omits reference to Dimicks' express argument
made in the trial court that no admissible evidence supports Oakwood's claim that
the subject product was approved by a government agency.
For these reasons, as well as those presented in Dimicks' Opening Brief,
Dimicks respectfully pray this Court enter its order vacating the trial court's
summary judgment order and remanding this matter for trial on the merits.
ADDENDA TO RECORD ON APPEAL PER RULE 24fa)Ql)(C)
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
ADDENDUM 1: Trial Court's Memorandum Decision on Defendants
Oakwood's Motion for Summary Judgment.
ADDENDUM 2: Plaintiffs Objection to Oakwood Defendants Proposed Finding
of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Certified Order of Final
Judgment.
ADDENDUM 3: Transcripts from Hearing on February 28, 2005.
ADDENDUM 4: Transcripts from Hearing on September 23, 2005.
2

RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM THE RECORD BELOW
WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD
PER RULE 24(a)(7), UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
1.

The

causal

relationship

between

the

defects

in

Appellee's

manufactured home and the hantavirus that killed the Appellants' decedent, Cathy
Dimick. and grievousl} injured Appellant Chris Dimick, was not disputed by
Appellee in the trial court, and Appellee expressly represented to the trial court
that causation was not an issue,
"The Court: Do I not even get to a question—or at least at this level of
whether there's evidence that the hantavirus came from mice that
were in this house as opposed to someplace else in the world?
Mr. Hitt [Oakwood's counsel]1: For this motion, your Honor, I don't think
we even have to reach that point. I think the threshold inquiry is—
The Court: These threeMr. Hitt: -is there a defect in this home."
(R. at 644, Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 18:15-23, February 28, 2005).
Oakwood's summary judgment motion rested solely on the argument that
"because there is no evidence of a defect or defective condition, [Dimicks] also
cannot meet the second and third prongs of the test." (R. at 304). Oakwood's
summary judgment motion was silent to causation.

-*

The transcript incorrectly labels the speaker during this colloquy as Mr. Booke when, in
fact, it was Oakwood* s counsel Mr. Justin Hitt.
Although causation was not raised by Oakwood's summary judgment motion, and that
position was reiterated in oral argument, Oakwood prepared Finding of Fact, Conclusions of
3

Even if causation had been an issue—although it was not raised or even
mentioned in Oakwood's summary judgment motion—the record does contain
sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact:
"On March 11, 2000, Reid Dimick, Cathy Dimick and Chris Dimick went
into a home, manufactured by Oakwood, which was sitting on the Happy Homes
sales lot in Helper, Utah. While looking in a bedroom closet, they saw deer mice
nestings and droppings. (R. at 382, 385, 427-434, 436).
On May 27, 2000, Cathy Dimick became violently ill with Hantavirus. She
died within three days of the onset of her final illness. Three days after Cathy's
death, Chris became violently ill with Hantavirus. He is now permanently disabled
as a result of the Hantavirus. (R. at 382-383, 385, 438-444).
Reid Dimick knows of no Hantavirus exposure that Cathy and Chris could
both have suffered, except for their simultaneous exposure in Oakwood's
manufactured home on the Happy Homes sales lot on March 11, 2000. (R. at 383,
385, 446-448)."
2.

Appellants specifically identified the alleged defect in Oakwood's

manufactured home for the trial court as being the 30-50 penetrations that were

Law, and Certified Order of Final Judgment, including Conclusion of Law "2. Plaintiffs offered
no evidence that the Home was unreasonably dangerous due to a defect or defective condition,
no evidence that a defect existed at the time the Home was sold, and no evidence that a defective
condition was the proximate cause of their alleged injuries." (R. at 616-617). Plaintiffs timely
objected to that conclusion, among others. (R. at 609-612).

4

purposely manufactured into the exterior walls and underside of the home, and not
covered after manufacture, thereby creating a point of entry for rodents, including
hantavirus-carrying deer mice that were known to be present in the Price/Helper
area where Oakwood knew the home would sit in an open-field sales lot. (R. at
382-384).
The record contains evidence of this defect, specifically, the testimony of
John Schram, an employee of the sales lot in Helper:
Q.
[By Mr. Booke] A little while ago you were talking about the
penetrations that were sometimes put in the modular homes for plumbing
and other reasons?
A.

[By Mr. Schram] Uh-huh.

Q.
Did you caulk those holes as part of patching up the holes or did you
put caulk in the holes that were already there for plumbing or other reasons,
electrical?
A.
The factor}7 puts their plumbing and electrical through the holes and
I'm not sure if they caulk or put like foam, the expanding foam. I think they
do in some instances put the expanding foam around the pipes where they
penetrate.
(R. at 451, 468-469). Mr. Schram further testified that, after the home arrived at
the Price/Helper sales lot, interior insulation could be seen through the
penetrations in the exterior walls. (R. at 399-401, 464-465).
This evidence was presented to the trial court in Appellants' opposition to
Appellee's summary judgment motion

(R. at 382- 384, 399-401) and in oral

5

argument on the motion (R. at 644, 645, Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 9:10-24, 12: 213, February 28, 2005).
3.

Dimicks unequivocally argued to the trial court that there was no

admissible or probative evidence that any government inspector inspected the
manufactured home, or that a government inspector approved the 30-50 open
penetrations, or that the home was approved by an\ government agency.
Specifically, the following argument was made relative to the HUD
inspection form:
"Mr. Booke:. . . Moving onto the specific findings of fact, finding of fact
No. 3 says that on June 24^, 1998 the home is inspected by the
United States Government and certified by the United States
Government.
There is no evidence in the record of that fact. What
there is is a form called the "HUD checklist.'' Somebody went
through a HUD checklist and checked off four pages worth of
stuff; but there is no evidence before your honor that that was a
government inspector that did that. No evidence that there was
any government approval of that—or inspection or approval of
that particular home.
With respect to—
The Court: Doesn't —doesn't the business record that was submitted do
that?
Mr. Booke: I think not.
The Court: Isn't that a business record?
Mr. Booke: Well, Fve got it right here, your Honor. It says-it's called a
"HUD Compliance Assurance Inspection Form." Now, there is
nothing whatsoever that shows on the face of the document or
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suggests—nor is there any testimony or covering affidavits or
anything like that that says that's a government form.
(R. 645, Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 12:2-23 September 23, 2005).
The court recognized the presence of Appellants* objection to a finding that
the home complied with government standards:
The Court: Well, in his [Dimicks] objection to the findings of fact,
paragraph 3, he says, "There's no evidence in the record that
the home met government standards."
(R. at 645, Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 13:10-12 September 23, 2005).
The absence of admissible evidence of government approval is underscored
by Appellee's counsel's failure to give a straight answer to the trial court's direct
question about the evidentiary sufficiency of the document that Appellee claimed
represented government approval:
Mr. Hitt:

. . . Now, this home, before it was tendered to the retailer,
passed HUD inspections. They looked at it. They said
everything was okay; and they sent it out.

The Court: And you have an affidavit in your motion to that effect, don't
you?
Mr. Hitt:

I have a HUD inspection checklist signed.

The Court: That's right, okay.
(R. at 644, Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 5:18-23, February 28, 2005).
Indeed, Appellee specifically misrepresented the content of the HUD
checklist to the trial court:

Mr. Hitt:

. . . They have penetrations in them. Those penetrations are
signed off by HUD.
They're part of the checklist the
government has said "Not a problem.'" which creates the
presumption that this home was free of defects . . .

(R. at 644, Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 16:11-14. February 28, 2005).
In fact, the HUD checklist is completely silent as to these penetrations. (R. at
331-338).
ARGUMENT
I.

CAUSATION WAS NOT DISPUTED BY APPELLEE, .AND WAS
WAIVED BY APPELLEE, IN THE TRIAL COURT.
The record is clear that Oakwood waived any causation argument by (1) not

raising the causation issue in its summary judgment motion, and (2) expressly
arguing to the trial court that causation need not be addressed. Then, despite not
having argued causation, Appellee included a Conclusion of Law concerning
causation, to which Plaintiffs timely objected.
Issues not properly raised at the trial court will not be considered by an
appellate court. Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, \ 9, 17 P.3d 1122. In Coleman,
the Utah Supreme Court refused to hear three issues that were not raised before the
trial court, and the record did not reveal the Appellant had ever asked that they be
addressed. Id.
In fact, although causation was not raised, the record does contain sufficient
evidence of causation to defeat summary judgment—the only time and place at
8

which Cathy and Chris Dimick were together during the incubation period for
hantavirus was when they disturbed a deer mice nest and droppings in a closet in
Appellee's manufactured home on a sales lot in Helper. (R. at 383). Deer mice are
carriers of hantavirus. (R. at 380). Cathy Dimick died from hantavirus and Chris
Dimick became seriously ill and permanently injured from hantavirus. (R. at 439,
382-383). Thus, the record—even though developed in the absence of a challenge
on the causation issue—clearly contains prima facie evidence of a causal link
between the specific defect and the injuries the Dimicks have suffered. (R. at 385).

II. THE RECORD CONTAINS EVIDENCE OF A SPECIFIC DEFECT,
AND APPELLANTS PRESENTED AND ARGUED THAT
EVIDENCE BELOW.
Appellants demonstrated below the existence of the 30-50 unsealed, predrilled holes in the exterior of Appellee's manufactured home, and argued that
those holes comprised a specific defect because the holes created points of entry
for hantavirus -carry ing deer mice.

To defeat a summary judgment motion, a

plaintiff need only show circumstantial evidence, whether expert or not, that a
defect existed. Taylor v. Cooper Tire and Rubber Co., 130 F.3d 1395, 1398, (10th
Cir. 1997) {applying Utah state law).
Moreover, HUD regulations specifically identify potential defects in a
manufactured home relative to the hazards of rodents entering the home: (1) the
seam around the base of the home, and (2) the openings around the predrilled

9

holes/ Those regulations provide that: "All exterior openings around piping and
equipment shall be sealed to resist the entrance of rodents.'" 24 C.F.R. 3280.603
(b)(6).
Appellee contends the holes were generally caulked. The record shows that
the holes were occasionally caulked. The testimony of John Schram, a person with
personal knowledge of the condition of the subject home on the sales lot in Helper,
is unambiguous in this respect: "I think in some instances they put the expanding
foam around the pipes where they penetrate." (R. at 451, 468-469). (Emphasis
added). Mr. Schram went on to say that he could see the pink insulation through
the penetrations in the exterior walls. (R. 399-401, 464-465).
Perhaps Appellee's home satisfied the HUD requirement that "All exterior
openings around piping and equipment shall be sealed to resist the entrance of
rodents." 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603(b)(6)—and perhaps it did not. Perhaps Appellee is
entitled to a presumption of non-defectiveness and perhaps it is not.

That is

precisely why summary judgment on these issues is inappropriate. Either way. it
is beyond fair dispute that the record reflects that Appellants presented evidence
and argued below that 30 to 50 unsealed penetrations in the exterior are a specific
defect in Appellee's product that is the subject of this action.

Indeed, the very HUD checklist on which Appellee's rely addresses rodents: "Bottom
Board was Sealed & Repaired to Prevent Rodent Access.'5 (R. at 338)
10

III.

THE
ISSUE
OF COMPLIANCE
WITH
GOVERNMENT
STANDARDS WAS ADDRESSED BELOW AND, THEREFORE,
PRESERVED FOR .APPEAL.
During oral argument on February 28, 2005, the trial court heard arguments

on the issue of whether the HUD document created a rebuttable presumption of
non-defectiveness. The trial court heard that the document was unsupported by
affidavits and was signed by an unidentified person. (Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr.
5:18-24, February 28, 2005).
The trial court also heard misrepresentations by Appellee as to how the
home met government standards in relationship to the penetrations in the walls—
an argument that the HUD checklist approved the unsealed exterior penetrations
when, in fact, the HUD document is silent as to approval of penetrations in the
walls and, specifically, as to the sealing of any penetrations in the exterior walls.
(R. at 331-338).
On September 23, 2005, the trial court heard further argument relative to the
authenticity of the HUD checklist and as to its admissibility. (Oral Argument
Hr'g. Tr. 12:2-23, September 23, 2005). Specifically, the trial court heard that
there was no evidence that a government employee signed or initialed the HUD
checklist. Id The trial court heard the argument that the record contained nothing
to indicate that the checklist was even from the government, and that from the face

11

of the document it appears to be initialed and completed by employees of
Oakwood. Id.
Moreover, even if the HUD checklist were "admissible evidence" under
Rule 56. the document should be admitted for exactly what it stands for—that the
house did not meet government standards, specifically it did not meet the
requirements of 24 CFR § 3280.603(b)(6). (Rodent resistance.

All exterior

openings around piping and equipment shall be sealed to resist the entrance of
rodents).
CONCLUSION
The presence of 30-50 unsealed holes is a specific defect in Oakwood's
Homes. This specific defect is identified in the record and was argued below. The
"HUD checklist" relied on to create a presumption of non-defectiveness does not
address these unsealed holes, it lacks all evidentiary foundation, and it is contrary
to the Code of Federal Regulations provisions cited in Oakwood*s Opening Brief.
The issue of wThether there was a causal connection between the unsealed hole
defect and the hantavirus contracted by Appellant, Chris Dimick, and Appellants'
decedent, Cathy Dimick, was not before the trial court and was never disputed by
Oakwood, which expressly waived assertion of that issue.
Under these circumstances, summary judgment is improper and Appellant,
Dimicks, respectfully requests this Court remand the case for trial on the merits.

12

Respectfully submitted this

2£

day of April 2006.

MORIARITY, BADARUDDIN & BOOKE

7\-$rtr&Ls
BRADLEYJL. BOOKE
ROBERT D. STRIEPER
Attorneys for Appellants
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The Court has reviewed the file herein, discussed with counsel in a telephone conference some
aspects of argument and the matter was submitted to the Court for decision on Oakwood defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court, after reviewing same, concludes that the Motion for
Summary Judgment by the Oakwood defendants is well taken and for the reasons outlined in
Oakwood's argument and the facts established in their memorandum concludes that there is no legal
justification for holding Oakwood defendants responsible nor any question of fact which needs to
be submitted to The trier of fact not established by the record. For the foregoing reasons, the Motion
for Summary Judgment by Oakwood defendants is hereby granted The Court requests attorney for
Oakwood defendants to prepare an appropriate Findings of Fact/Conclusions of Law and Order for
Summary Judgment herein.
DATED this
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THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
REID DiMICK, individually and as the
personal representative of the Estate of
CATHLEEN DIMICK, CHRISTOPHER
DIMICK, KIRT DIMICK, JEREMY DIMICK,
BRYAN DIMICK, MATTHEW KLOEPFER
and BETTY JO KLOEPFER, heirs of the
Estate of CATHERINE ANN DIMICK,
Deceased; and CHRISTOPHER DIMICK,
individually,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, and CERTIFIED ORDER OF
FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 020700324
v.
Judge: Bruce K. Haliiday
UNIVERSITY HOMES, INC., dba HAPPY
HOMES (HELPER) and dba HAPPY
HOMES VERNAL, a South Dakota
Corporation; MIKE HAAKINSON;
OAKWOOD MOBILE HOMES, INC., an
Indiana Corporation; OAKWOOD SHARED
SERVICES, LLC (a/k/a Schult Homes
Corporation), a Delaware Corporation;
SCHULT HOMES CORPORATION, a North
Carolina Corporation; HBOS
MANUFACTURING, LP (a/k/a Homes By
Oakwood, lnc.)(a/k/a Schult Homes
Corporation); LIFESTYLE HOMES, a Utah
partnership, JOHN SCHRAM, ROBERT
HOGGATT, MARY MUSGRAVE, HEIDI
ESSEX and JOHN DOES l-X,
Defendants.

On February 28, 2005 the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by OHC Liquidation Trust
as successor in interest to defendants Oakwood Mobile Homes, inc., Oakwood Shared
Services, LLC, Schult Homes Corporation, and HBOS Manufacturing, LP (collectively
"Oakwood") came before the Court for oral argument. The Court, having heard orai arguments,
having reviewed the motions and authorities cited therein, and being fully advised, enters the
following Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and resulting Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and specifically
finds as follows:
1.

On May 18, 1998, Happy Homes ordered a manufactured home from Oakwood.

2.

Pursuant to Happy Homes' order, Oakwood manufactured a home (model

number 5828} bearing serial numbers 284627A and B (the "Home") for sale and delivery to
Happy Homes.
3.

On June 24, 1998, the Home was inspected by an inspector for the United States

Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Home met government standards as was
certified by the inspector as such by the affixation of Department of Housing and Urban
Development numbers 415130 and 415131 thereto.
4.

Happy Homes tendered payment for the Home and the Home was delivered to

Happy Homes' sales lot in June 1998.
5.

Prior to accepting delivery and possession of the Home, Happy Homes' agents

and employees inspected the Home.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order
Dimick v. Oakwood, et al.
Civil No, 020700324
Page 2

6.

Happy Homes' agents and employees did not observe any problems with, defects

in, or defective conditions in the Home when Happy Homes received, inspected, and took
possession of the Home. The Home was ready for retail sale when received by Happy Homes.
7.

Happy Homes never notified Oakwood of any problems with, defects in, or

defective conditions of the Home.
8.

On March 11, 2000, Christopher Dimick toured the Home with his parents, Reid

and Cathy Dimick, and that same day contracted to buy the Home from Happy Homes.
9.

The Home sat on Happy Homes rural sales lot in Helper, Utah from June 1998

until the Home was delivered to Christopher Dimick's property on May 22, 2000.
10.

Happy Homes hired John Schram to assemble the Home on the Happy Homes

lot when it was received from Oakwood in 1998 and to disassemble the Home for transport to
the Dimick property in 2000. Mr. Schram did not observe any defects in or problems with the
Home on either occasion.
11.

Mary Musgrave worked as a sales agent for Happy Homes in Helper, Utah. Ms.

Musgrave showed the Home to prospective purchasers "countless" times between June 1998
and May 2000. Ms. Musgrave never observed any manufacturing defects in the Home and never
saw any evidence of mice in the Home.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court finds that there is no justification for holding the Oakwood defendants liable for
plaintiffs' alleged injuries and damages, and specifically concludes as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs failed to rebut the Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3) presumption that the

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order
Dimick v. Oakwood, et ai
Civil No. 020700324
Page 3

Home was free from any defect or defective condition because the Home complied with
government standards relating to design, manufacture, and inspection of manufactured homes.
2.

Plaintiffs offered no evidence that the Home was unreasonably dangerous

due to a defect or defective condition, no evidence that a defect existed at the time the Home
was sold, and no evidence that a defective condition was the proximate cause of their alleged
injuries. Therefore plaintiffs' claims against Oakwood for strict products liability and breach of
warranty (merchantability) fail as a matter of law.
3.

There is no evidence of a defect or defective condition in the Home, a necessary

element of plaintiffs' claim against Oakwood for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, and therefore the claim fails as a matter of law.
4.

There is no evidence of any defect or defective condition in the home, and no

evidence that Oakwood breached any express warranty, and therefore the claim fails as a
matter of law.
5.

There is no evidence of a defect or defective condition in the Home, a necessary

element of plaintiffs' claim against Oakwood for negligent failure to warn, and therefore the claim
fails as a matter of law.
6.

There is no evidence that Oakwood had any ownership or possessory interest in

the Home after it had been sold and delivered to Happy Homes, and therefore Oakwood did not
owe any duty to plaintiffs as a premises owner. Additionally, there is no evidence of a defect,
defective condition, or unsafe condition in the Home that proximately caused plaintiffs' alleged
injuries. Because these are necessary elements of plaintiffs' premises liability claim against
Oakwood, the claim fails as a matter of law.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order
Dimick v. Oakwood, et al.
Civil No. 020700324
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ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by OHC
Liquidation Trust as successor in interest to Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., Oakwood Shared
Services, LLC, Schult Homes Corporation, and HBOS Manufacturing, LP is granted. Judgment
is entered in favor of defendants Oakwood Mobile Homes, inc., Oakwood Shared Services, LLC,
Schult Homes Corporation, and HBOS Manufacturing, LP and against plaintiffs on all claims
asserted by plaintiffs against these defendants in plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, All claims
against defendants Oakwood Mobile Homes, inc., Oakwood Shared Services, LLC, Schult
Homes Corporation, and HBOS Manufacturing, LP are dismissed on the merits with prejudice.
In accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), the Court finds there is no just reason for delay
and directs entry of final judgment in favor of the Oakwood defendants.
DATED this

day of

, 2005.
BY THE COURT

JUDGE BRUCE K. HALUDAY
APPROVED AS TO FORM;

BRADLEY L. BOOKE
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Rcid Dimick, individually and as the
personal representative of the estate of
Cathaleen Dimick, Christopher Dimick,
Ktrt Dimick, Jeremy Dfrrridc, Bryan
Dimick, Matthew KLoepfer and Bc±ty Jo
Kloepfer, Heirs of the Estate of
Catherine Ann Dimick, Deceased;
and Christopher Dxmick, individually

Haintiffe,
v.
University Homes, Inc., dba Happy
Homes (Helper) and dba Happy
Homes Vernal, a South Dakota
Corporation; Mike Haakinson;
Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc./ an
Indiana Corporation: lifestyle Homes,
a Utah partnership/ John Scnram,
Robert Hoggatt, Mary
Musgrave, Heidi Essex and John Does
1-X,
Defendant

PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO
OAKWOOD DEFENDANTS'
FROPOSED FLNDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
CERTIFIED ORDER OF FINAL
JUDGMENT
Civil No, 020700324
Judge: Bruce K Halliday
[ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED]

Plaintiffs, through counsel* pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah R CiY, P., object to the
Oakwood Defendants' proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and certified order
of final judgment dated April 27, 2005% on the following grounds:

Plaintiffs7 Notice of Objection to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order and Certified Final Judgment
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OBJECTION TO FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Tile Court granted Defendant's motion for smnmary judgment, bur did not grant a

"Certified Final Judgment"
2.

The Court's written order-does not make the findings of fact listed as proposed

Findings 1-1L
3.

There is no evidence in the record that "The Home met government standards*" as

set forth in finding #3; the only evidence on that issue is that a numbered certificate was
issued; there is no specification of the government standards referred to in finding #3.
4.

Finding #4 is contrary to the undisputed record as to when> how and who made

payment for "fee Home" because the record shows that the home was not paid for until
the Dhnick transaction dosed in late May or early June, 20005.

Finding #5 is contrary to the record with respect to Happy Homes' inspection of

the Home before contains accepting delivery and possession.
6.

Finding #6 contains legal conclusions, not facts, concerning "defects* and

"defective conditions/' and is contrary to the record as to Happy Homes making no
observation about damage to the Home or defects in the Home at the time Happy Homes
took delivery, and is contrary to the record as to tbe Home being "ready for retail sale" at
the time of receipt.
7.

Finding #7 contains legal conclusions, not facts, concerning "defects*' and

"defective conditions."
8.

Hading #S is contrary to (he record in &at Reid Dinuck did not "tour" the home

on March 11,2000,

Plaintiffs' Notice of Objection to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order and Certified Final Judgment
Page 2 of 4
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Finding #9 is contrary to the record as to the identity of the owner of the sales lot

on May 22,2000.
10.

Finding #10 is contrary to the record in that the home was not "assembled" on the

Happy Homes lot and was not "disassembled** in 2000, and the finding contains legal
conclusions, not findings of fact, with regard to "defects."
11.

Finding #11 is unsupported by the record is contrary to the record* and contains

an expert opinion that lacks foundation in that the witness identified is not qualified to
render such an opinion and lacks a factual basis for such opinion.
OBJECTION TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Conclusion #1 is unsupported by the Court's order, which makes no reference as

to compliance with government standards.
2.

The Court made no findings of fact that would support Conclusion #2; Plaintiffs

did offer evidence of defect and defective condition in the design and manufacture of the
home; and the issue of breach of warranty was not raised in Defendant's motion.
3.

Conclusion #3 is contrary to the record in that Plaintiffs did offer evidence of

defect and defective condition in the design and manufacture of the home, and the issue
of breach of warranty was not raised in Defendant's motion.
4.

Conclusion #4 is contrary to tie record in thai Plaintiffs did offer evidence of

defect and defective condition in the design and manufacture of the home, and the issue
of breach of warranty was not raised in Defendant's motion.
5.

Conclusion #5 is contrary to the record in that Plaintiffs did offer evidence of

defect and defective condition in the design and manufacture of the home, and the issue
of failure to warn was not raised in Defendant's motion.
Plaintiffs' Notice of Objection to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order and Certified Final Judgment
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Conclusion #6 is contrary to the record in that there is evidence that ownership of

the home did not pass untii after Cathy and Chris Dimick were exposed to Hantavirus,
and in char Plaintiffs did offer evidence of defect and defective condition in the design
and manufacture of the home.
OBJECTION TO ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT
1.

Plaintiffs object to the granting of summary judgment of warranty and negligence

claims because Defendant's motion did not attack those claims.
X

Plaintiffs object to certification of the Court's order under Rule 54(b) because

Defendant did not seek 54(b) certification, the issue has not been briefed or argued to the
Court, and such certification is untimely and would encourage piecemeal litigation,
DATED this 29th day of April, 2005.

MORIARITY, GOOCH, BADARUDDIN &
BOOKE

Bradley i i Booke (9984)
9 Exchan^/Place, #700
Salt Lake City, UT 841J1
Telephone:
(801)521-0811
Fax:
(801) 521-0437
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Reid Dimick, individually and as the
personal representative of the estate of
Cathaleen Dimick, Christopher Dimick;
Kiit Dimick, Jeremy Dimick, Bryan
Dimick, Matthew Kloepfer and Betty Jo
Ktoepfer, Heirs of the Estate of
Catherine Ann Dimick, Deceased;
and Christopher Dimick, individually,
Plaintiffs,

University Homes, Inc., dba Happy
Homes (Helper) and dba Happy
Homes Vernal, a South Dakota
Corporation; Mike Haakinson;
Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., an
Indiana Corporation; Lifestyle Homes,
a Utah partnership, John Schram,
Robert Hoggatt, Mary
Musgrave, Heidi Essex and John Does
I-X,
Defendant

PLAINTIFFS7 OBJECTION TO
OAKWOOD DEFENDANTS 7
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
CERTIFIED ORDER OF FINAL
JUDGMENT
Gvil No. 020700324
Judge: Bruce K. Halliday
[ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED]

Plaintiffs, through counsel, pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah R. Civ. R, object to the
Oakwood Defendants" proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and certified order
of final judgment dated April 27, 2005, on the following grounds:

Plaintiffs" Notice of Objection to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order and Certified Final Judgment
Page 1 of 4

OBJECTION TO FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court granted Defendant's motion for summary7 judgment but did not grant a

"Certified Final Judgment"
2.

The Court's written order does not make the findings of fact listed as proposed

Findings 1-11.
3.

There is no evidence in the record that "The Home met government standards" as

set forth in finding #3; the only evidence on that issue is that a numbered certificate was
issued: there is no specification of the government standards referred to in finding #3.
4.

Finding #4 is contrary to the undisputed record as to when, how and who made

payment for "the Home" because the record shows that the home was not paid for until
the Dimick transaction closed in late May or early June, 2000.
5.

Finding #5 is contrary to the record with respect to Happy Homes' inspection of

the Home before contains accepting delivery and possession.
6.

Finding #6 contains legal conclusions, not facts, concerning "defects" and

"defective conditions," and is contrary to the record as to Happy Homes making no
observation about damage to the Home or defects in the Home at the time Happy Homes
took delivery, and is contrary to the record as to the Home being "ready for retail sale" at
the time of receipt
7.

Finding #7 contains legal conclusions, not facts, concerning "defects" and

"defective conditions."
8.

Finding #8 is contrary to the record in that Reid Dimick did not "tour" the home

on March 11, 2000.

Plaintiffs' Notice of Objection to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order and Certified Final Judgment
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9.

Finding #9 is contrary to the record as to the identity of the owner of the sales lot

on May 22, 2000.
10.

Finding #10 is contrary to the record in that the home was not 'assembled" on the

Happy Homes lot and was not "disassembled" in 2000, and the finding contains legal
conclusions, not findings of fact with regard to "defects."
11.

Finding #11 is unsupported by the record, is contrary to the record, and contains

an expert opinion that lacks foundation in that the witness identified is not qualified to
render such an opinion and lacks a factual basis for such opinion.
OBJECTION TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Conclusion #1 is unsupported by the Court's order, which makes no reference as

to compliance with government standards.
2.

The Court made no findings of fact that would support Conclusion #2; Plaintiffs

did offer evidence of defect and defective condition in the design and manufacture of the
home; and the issue of breach of warranty was not raised in Defendant's motion.
3.

Conclusion #3 is contrary to the record in that Plaintiffs did offer evidence of

defect and defective condition in the design and manufacture of the home, and the issue
of breach of warranty7 was not raised in Defendant's motion.
4.

Conclusion #4 is contrary to the record in that Plaintiffs did offer evidence of

defect and defective condition in the design and manufacture of the home, and the issue
of breach of warranty was not raised in Defendant's motion.
5.

Conclusion #5 is contrary to the record in that Plaintiffs did offer evidence of

defect and defective condition in the design and manufacture of the home, and the issue
of failure to warn was not raised in Defendant's motion.
Plaintiffs' Notice of Objection to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact Conclusions of
Law, and Order and Certified Final Judgment
Page 3 of 4

6.

Conclusion #6 is contrary to the record in that there is evidence that ownership of

the home did not pass until after Cathy and Chris Dimick were exposed to Hantavirus,
and in that Plaintiffs did offer evidence of defect and defective condition in the design
and manufacture of the home.
OBJECTION TO ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT
1.

Plaintiffs object to the granting of summary judgment of warranty and negligence

claims because Defendant's motion did not attack those claims.
2.

Plaintiffs object to certification of the Court's order under Rule 54(b) because

Defendant did not seek 54(b) certification, the issue has not been briefed or argued to the
Court and such certification is untimely and would encourage piecemeal litigation.
DATED this 29th day of April, 2005.

MORIARITY, GOOCH, BADARUDDIN &
BOOKE
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Bradley U Booke (9984)
9 Exchange Place, #700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone:
(801)521-0811
Fax:
(801)521-0437
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DIMICK ana BETTY JO
KLOEPFER, et al,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 020700324

vs •
UNIVERSITY HOMES and
HEIDI ESSEX, er al,
Defendants.

)
Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
February 2 8, 2 005

BEFORE: THE HQN0RA3LE BRUCE K. HALLIDAY
Seventh District Court Juage

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

Bradley L. Booke
MORIARTY, BOOCH,
BADARUDDIN & BOOKE
9 Exchange Place, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utan 84111

For the Defendant:

H. Justin Hitt
PLANT & WALLACE
136 East South Temple, #1700
Salt Lake City, Utan 84111

Also Present Via Telephone:

Michael P. Zaccheo

Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT

1909 South Washington Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 377-0027
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P R O C E E D I N G S
{Electronically recorded on February 28, 2005)
THE COURT: Call the Dimick vs. University Homes
matter.
COURT CLERK: Do we need to call his attorney?
THE COURT: Okay.

Can you make rhat call?

(Court clerk speaking softly)
THE COURT: This was Zaccheo, wasn't it, that was —
ahead and sir down.
you all —

Thanks, gentlemen.

go

I'm sorry that I kept

you've been here as long as I have today.

MR. BOOKE: Your Honor, I've been doing this 27, 28
years; and I don't know that I've ever seen a day when anybody
handled as many matters as you have handled while I've been
sitting here.
THE COURT: This was a bad day; and it couldn't have
been a worse day.
MR. BOOKE: Okay.

Is it just because they're ail

collected into a single law and motion day?
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. BOOKE: Is that the ordinary

—

THE COURT: Yeah, and usually if I'm going to have
that kind of day, I have some sort of forewarning and I don't
schedule oral argument.

I think I did do oral argument before

I had any idea that I was going to

—

MR. BOOKE: Well, I'm not complaining.

- j -

1

THE COURT: Yeah.

2

MR. BOOKE: I'm just observing the loads.

3

THE COURT: I agree.

4

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Yeah, he's out there; he's there.

5

(Mr. Zaccheo is present for hearing via telephone)

6

THE COURT: Can you hear me, Mr. Zaccheo?

7

MR. ZACCHEO: Just barely, Judge.

8

THE COURT: Well, my voice isn't very good, but we'll

9

try to speak up.

Do you got Mr. Zaccheo?

We have Counsel here, and they've assured me

10

that about ten minutes each is all that they're going to need.

11

Who's going to lead off?

12

Who' s motion?

MR. HITT: It's my motion motion, your Honor.

Justin

13

Hitt on behalf of OHC Liquidation Trust.

14

THE COURT: Thank you.

15

MR. HITT: A successor in interest to --

16

THE COURT: Can you hear him?

17

MR. ZACCHEO: I really can't, your Honor.

18

you know, I'll just stay on the line; and ;_f the Court has

19

any questions regarding my client, I'll be happy to respond.

20

That's really the only reason I have to be here anyway.

21

(Counsel speak with clerk off the record)

22

THE COURT: That's a recording.

23

magnify; but try to speak up if you can.

24

MR. HITT: Yes, your Honor.

25

THE COURT: Go ahead.

I guess,

I don't think it will

-4
MR. KITT: Your Honor, this case is right for summary
judgment in favor of the Oakwood defendants, my clients.
case has been pending for two-and-a-half years.

This

It's evident

that there's no dispute as to any material fact at this point;
and Oakwood is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
(Sound of dial tone of phone in the courtroom)
THE COURT: Are you there?
COURT CLERK: No, he's not.

He hung up.

THE COURT: Weil, we're on the record.
record.

We're making a

He can get a copy of the record that we make; and

let's just go forward on that basis.
MR. HITT: Okay.

Your Honor, in our opening memorandum

we set forth material facts that we believe are relevant to our
motion.

In response, opposing Counsel did not dispute any of

those facts in accordance with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff s focus on general allegations with respect
to this mobile home that was purchased by Christopher Dimick.
In March of 2 0 00 Christopher Dxmick toured a mobile home on the
Happy Homes lot; and he alleges that he had his mother observed
a mouse nest in this manufactured home.
Now, a manufactured home that sat on the Happy Homes
lot for two years; and in those two years Happy Homes had never
observed a defect in the home.

They'd never informed the

manufacturer of a defect in the home.

In fact, the home was

-5delivered to Happy Homes without any problem.
concerns with it.

They had no

They (inaudible) and sat on their lot.

There is no dispute as to chat.
Instead, plaintiff alleges that this home, as pare
cf its manufacture, had 30 to 50 penetrations in the walls and
the floors, so as to hook up electrical, plumbing components
and that sort cf thing.

Now, that's actually just a general

allegation, not specific with respect to this Dimick home.
The actual evidence, the deposition testimony of John
Schramm who was instrumental m

setting up the home, was that

generally these penetrations would be calked, they'd be covered
with belli paper, that type of thing.
What's really important for purposes cf this motion,
is that even if there were penetrations m

the home, Utah's

product liability statute says that a home is —

there's a

rebuttable presumption that a home is free of defects if the
home was constructed in accordance with government standards
applicable at the time.

Now, this home, before it was tendered

to the retailer, passed HUD inspections.

They looked at it.

They said everything was okay; and they sent it out.
THE COURT: And you have an affidavit in your motion to
that effect, don't you?
MR. KITT: I have a HUD inspection checklist signed.
THE COURT: That's right, okay.
MR. KITT: That was provided in the course of discovery

-6Now, the material facts with respect to the defect are clear.
There's no dispute as to that.

Which means that this Court can

rule as a matter of law that plaintiffs do not have a valid
strict products liability claim against my clients.
Now, in order to prevail on a claim for strict
products liability, as the Court is well aware, the plaintiff
must meet a three-part test.

That test is set forth both

m

the statute and in the case I've cited, Burns vs. Canada.
Critical to a finding of strict liability is that there is
a defect in the home; and that that defect existed at the time
of sale and was a proximate cause of the injury.
In this instance we don/1 have evidence of a defect
that rendered this home unreasonably dangerous.

The home was

in accordance with ail government standards, and the retailer
to whom the home was initially sold never observed any problem
with the home's construction.

It was just fine.

Now, plaintiff's complaint is very difficult to read.
I also attached that in papers.

I don't know if the Court's

had an opportunity to look at that, but apparently they both

—

they've been included plaintiff's other (inaudible) liability
today, purport to assert it against my clients.
One of those claims being breach of warranty of
merchantability.

Now, the case law says that the analysis

for breach of warranty for merchantability is the same analysis
as strict products liability, which requires evidence cf a

~7~

1

defect.

2

There is no evidence of a defect here.
Next they argue that there is a breach of express

3

warranty; and rhey allege that the express warranty was tnat

4

Mike Rackxngson told Hugh Dimick that he would have the mice

5

nest cleaned out of the home before the home was delivered to

6

Christopher Dimick.
That wasn r : a warranty made by my clients.

7
8

had nothing to do with that promise.

9

even had any notice cf alleged mice m

10

My clients

in fact, my clients never
the home until they were

served with this lawsuit.

11

An additional claim is that there was somehow a breach

12

of implied warranty of fitness; and that the Happy Homes person

13

—

14

seal off of the home.

15

manufacture, my clients, placed a protective seal around this

16

home for delivery to the lot.

17

Happy Homes personnel took that seal off.

18

now, when they received the home took the manufacturing

So m

So the presupposition m

that is the

Then once it got to the lot, the

that instance my clients didn't breach any

19

implied warranty of merchantability, because they didn't take

20

off the seal.

21

They provided the seal; they didn't remove it.

The next claim that is purportedly asserted is a

22

failure to warn.

That failure to warn has to do with Happy

23

Homes taking off the protective covering, the manufactured

24

place seal.

25

Happy Homes as the remover of that manufacturer's place seal.

So that claim is more appropriately directed to

-8Finally, they say that my clients are liable under a
premises liability theory.

The undisputed facrs are that my

3 I clients did not own the home afrer it was sold.

Happy Homes

4 I in request for admissions, stated that they tendered payment
5 I for Lhe home after they ordered it; and title to the home
rested with the bankr not with my clients.

My clients had no

ownership interest: in the home after its sale.
So essentially what we're left with in this case is a
9

claim that these penetrations in the home somehow rendered this

10

home unreasonably dangerous and defective.

Instead, we have a

11

siaiute, 78-15-6 subparagraph (3) that says that "A product

12

presumed to be defect free if it's manufactured in accordance

13 I with government standards in effect at the time."

There's

14 I no dispute here that the home was in accordance with those
15

standards.

16

So that presumption has not been rebutted.

Therefore, under the authority set forth in Burns,

17

because there's no evidence of a specific defect in this case,

18

my clients are entitled to summary judgment, and there are no

19

disputes as to material fact.

20

THE COURT: Thank you.

21

MR. BOOKE: And may it please the Court and Counsel,

22

Brad Booke is my name, your Honor.

I represent the Dimick

23

family.

24

every person who was involved in any way in the receipt,

25

handling, and setup of the mobile home that's involved, and

There have been the depositions taken, I think, of

-9
in the shopping for and the sale of rhe home that is involved
here.
A fair reading of the facts contained in those
depositions and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from those depositions present the Court with a record from
which the following facts and reasonable inferences can be
drawn.
The Oakwood defendant manufactured a mobile home and
shipped a mobile home to Helper,. Utah for placement on the
sales lot that had between 30 and 50 penetrations m

the wails

of the home and in the floor of the home.
Those penetrations were manufactured into the home for
a particular purpose.

The purpose for the holes was to provide

for access for utilities that were stubbed out on the lot on
the foundation where the home would ultimately be placed after
it had been sold.
The result of the placement of those holes was to
provide access points —

30 to 50 SLOCBSS points for deer mice

or anything else that might be on a lot that is m

essence just

a dirt lot up against a mountain.
The testimony that is in the record of the case, your
Honor, is that some of those holes were foamed to some degree,
but not all of those holes were foamed, and not all of the
holes were foamed completely.
The testimony is that the floor of the mobile home --

-101

not the wails, but the floor of the mobile home was covered

2

with a sheet of paper —

3

paper."

4

home is shipped from the manufacturer I O the lot m

5

Utah, the —

6

in that belli paper.

7

that they call in the trade "belli

The further testimony is that ir. transit, when that
Helper,

that belli paper is torn; and that there are holes

The further testimony is that the manufacturer knows

8

that that occurs.

9

paper, exposing the holes that are in the underside that

Knows the holes are torn in that belli

10

have been manufactured into the underside of the mobile home,

11

because the manufacturer provides repair or replacement belli

12

paper to the mobile home lot in order to have it replaced after

13

the mobile home has reached the lot.

14

The testimony is that some of the walls of the mobile

15

home are sometimes wrapped in a plastic shield; but testimony

16

is also that most homes are not wrapped in a plastic sheet on

17

the exterior walls.

18

this pa rticular home was wrapped in a piast ic s hee -•

19

The evidence is conflicting as to whether

In that context, in the context of tha t r Bccrd, homes

20

—

holes manufactured in may be covered, ma ybe not T the record

21

is that three members of the Dimick family visi ted the mobile

22

home lot on two occasi ons

23

family have testified that on each of those occasions r e a c h

24

of them saw mice nests and mice droppings.

25

Dimicks who visited uh e 1ox: on those two oc casi ons cont racted

The two survive rs o f the Di.mi c k

Two of the three

i

-11haunta virus carried by deer mice, and one of these Dimicks is
dead as a result of the haunta virus.

The other is permanently

disabled as a result of the haunta virus.
That is the factual information that is contained in
the record that is before you at this time in the case.

Now,

as to the strict products liability theory, your Honor, that
recited record does constitute a prima facie case of strict
products liability.

It does contain evidence that supports

each of the three elements of the strict products liability
claim.
There is a defect specifically.

That defect is that

30 to 50 holes are manufactured into the home at the factory by
this defendant at the time the mobile home is billed.
shipped with those holes to the lot in Helper.

It is

It arrives on

the lot in Helper with those holes in the condition in which it
was manufactured at the plant.

Those holes provide 30 to 50

points of access for deer mice to enter.
It is undisputed in this case —

well, excuse me.

It

is a disputed question of fact whether the deer mice nests and
the deer mice droppings were seen.
testified that it was.

There are two people who

There have been two or three people

who testified that those things were not present; but that's a
disputed question of fact.

What is undisputed is that Cathy

and Chris Dimick contracted haunta virus.
other survives but is disabled.

One died, and the

-121

The point is that with respect to the elements of a

2

products liability case, there is evidence of a specific defect

3

that was built in at the plant and that the product arrived in

4

exactly the same condition as —

5

in the way it was manufactured

The evidence is disputed as to whether any or all

6

of those holes, penetrations were covered; and if so, the

7

evidence is disputed to what degree any or ail of those holes

8

were covered.

9

The fact is that there is evidence that supports the

10

presence of a defect, evidence that supports the element that

11

the product was delivered in the fashion in which it was

12

manufactured, and evidence that the defect that is present

13

causes injury and damage in this specific case.

14

Now, I don't know that the argument has especially

15

been made, but anticipating the argument that these holes were

16

—

17

purpose, and that that was a reasonable and proper purpose, we

18

don/t dispute that these holes were manufactured into the home

19

for a purpose.

20

these penetrations were made into the home for a particular

The problem is that there was an unintended result

21

of that legitimate purpose.

22

been managed in a very simple way, but it was not.

23

simply could have been covered up until the home was sold and

24

it was ready for delivery to the ultimate consumer.

25

That unintended result could have
Those holes

As to each of the elements required, notwithstanding

-131 I the statute, those elements , there is evidence m

the record

2 I that is before you that supports each of those three elements.
3 I So a prima facie case is present.
4

As to the warranty and negligence theories, your

5 I Honor, that are argued for the very first time in the reply
brief, very first time in the reply brief, under the case of
Brown vs. Glover, your Honor, 2000 Utah 89 16P.2d —

P.3d 540,

the belated argument appearing for the first time in a reply
brief about trying to add additional theories into a motion fo:
10

summary judgment, those arguments are waived.

11

The Brown case says, ^Generally issues raised in the

.2

reply brief that were not presented in the opening brief are

13

considered waived and will not be considered by the Court."

14

Here's the critical one.

>x

This is to prevent the resulting

15 I unfairness to the respondent if an argument or issue was
16 I first raised in the reply brief, and the respondent had no
17

opportunity to respond."

13

The fact here, your Honor, is that the defendant's

19

motion is completely silent as to any motion on a warranty

20

theory or on a negligence theory.

21

challenged only the strict products liability theory.

22

defendant's motion cited only the strict products liability

23

statute.

24
25

The defendant's motion
The

It cited only products liability cases.
The defendant's motion cited nothing about a warranty

or a negligence theory.

The first mention of any attack on the

-14warranty or negligence theories in the plaintiff s complaint
was in the reply brief.

I think it is unfair of the defendant

to do that; but also unfair and somewhat disingenuous to argue
that it is not clear in the amended complaint what theories of
liability the plaintiff alleges.
First of all, the amended complaint that is attached
to the defendant's reply brief is not the operative amended
complaint in the case.
complaint.

They attached a second amended

There is in fact a third amended complaint that

is the operative complaint in the case.
That third amended complaint lays out in bold
underscored sections what each of the specific theories of
liability are; and each of those theories of liability are
specifically pied in contrast to the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, which is completely silent as to any
challenge on those theories.
That is the very reason why that Brown case says that
this is to prevent the unfairness involved m

being unable to

respond to something that is raised for the first time in a
reply brief.
The bottom line, your Honor, is that the plaintiff has
an obligation to come forward with evidence in the record that
supports each of the elements of a products liability theory.
The record does contain evidence that supports each of those.
I certainly agree that that evidence is disputed,

-15
that there is argument about it, there is conflicting evidence.
That is exactly why this is a case a jury should decide whether
that product was defective at the time it was delivered or
whether it was not.

This is a case for the juryto decide,

and we respectfully request the Court permit that to happen.
MR. HITT: Your Honor, if Z may.
rebuttal.

Three points in

First, with all due respect to opposing Counsel,

he takes too much liberty with the evidence in the record
when he speaks of deposition testimony with respect to 30 to
50 penetrations in the hole, as well as belli paper tears and
those arguments.
He cited John Schramm's testimony.

John Schramm's

testimony is set out in our reply brief where he says that the
penetrations in the floor are not accessible because they are
covered with belli paper.
When John Schramm testifies about tears in the belli
paper, he isn't speaking about Oakwood Homes in general, or
even this Oakwood home in particular.

He's simply testifying

with his experience cf approximately 400 mobile homes.

He's

not pointing the finger at any particular manufacturer.

So

there is not such evidence that supports the claim against
Oakwood in this instance.
Second, Counsel says that the evidence in this case is
conflicting and is in dispute.

In response I would say that if

the evidence were actually conflicting and were in dispute,

-16those material facts that are disputed would be set forth in
their opposing memorandum with citations to the record.
The material facts we set forth in our opening
memorandum were not properly disputed; and a fair reading of
those facts indicates that those facts indicates that the home
was delivered without any manufacturing defects and ready for
retail sale.
Most importantly, the holes penetrations that Counsel
is alleging are a defect are not a defect.
—

The home was un

was just like any other manufactured home that's being

distributed across the country.
them.

They have penetrations in

Those penetrations are signed off by HUD.

They're part

of the checklist the government has said "Not a problem," which
creates the presumption that this home was free of defects.
Now, this home did not fail them in any respect.

The

purchaser of the home, Happy Homes, observed nothing; informed
Oakwood of no problems with the home.

So to call these holes

a defect goes against the statutory language of Utah/ s product
liability statute, and also presupposes that homes should be
delivered hermetically sealed.

You know, that's not practical

and it's not effective.
These homes are living, breathing buildings, that
have doors that open, windows that open.
the elements.

They're exposed to

So simply because this home had penetrations,

doesn't render it defective.

-17
Now, importantly, John Schramm's testimony is that
holes in the wall of the manufactured home did not see through.
You wouldn't look through one hole and see into the home,
or in the home out the hole to see to the outside.
protected in that regard.

They're

Again, the holes in the floor, those

are covered with belli paper; and those aren't accessible from
under the floor.

So there's no evidence that those holes would

be defective or unreasonably dangerous.
Now, with respect to the plaintiff s complaint and
these allegations, we know that in our opening memorandum the
plaintiff's complaint was difficult to decipher; and it was
entirely difficult to try and decide exactly what claims they
were manufacturing against us.
I think we can ail agree that plaintiffs are trying to
assert with the greatest thrust the strict products liability
claim.

We would be happy to come back on another motion for

summary judgment on the remaining claims if the Court would so
like; but I believe that they were properly addressed.
The argument was preserved in the opening memorandum
by saying that, you know, w We r re not entirely certain what's
being argued here."

Plaintiff came back and said, "These are

the claims that we're asserting against you," and in turn, we
show that how those arguments were pled was not in fairness of
defending against us.

We would respect the Court's judgment

to treat this as a motion for partial summary judgment on the
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strict produces iiahilxty d a m n as well as ours; ano suDimt it
MR. BOOKE: Your Honor, may I just maKe one fj_nal

2
3

point.

With regard to

—

4

THE COURT: I guess I'll allow it.

5

MR. BOOKE: Thank you.

6

THE COURT. You've been so patient w_tr me .

7

MR. BOOKE: Thank you, your Honor
what tlie test:imony cDf the individuals says

With respect to
we have cited

and attached copies of the pages of tne transcripts of tne

10

deposition tnat support tne facts that I have arguea to the

11

Court this afternoon.

12

what they say.

13

what they say; but clearly the evidence that we've argued _s,

14

is supported by the deposition transcripts.

We respectfully submit that they say

I understand that Counsel doesn't agree with

Thank you.

15

THE COURT: Do I not ever get to a question —

16

least at this level of wnether there's evidence that the raurta

17

virus came froir mice that were m

18

someplace else in the world?

19

th^s house as opposed to

MR. BOOKE: For this motion, your Honor, I don't think

20

we even have to reach that point.

21

inquiry is --

22

THE COURT: These three

23

MR. BOOKE: —

24

THE COURT: Okay.

25

or at

I think the threshold

—

is tnere a defect in this home.
Then it may surprise you, but I

don't remember what Brown says, if I've ever read it.

I intend

-19
to go back and read it.

I also need to read the specific

documents that you've alluded to, because I haven't read
those.

I've read ma-ill y the pleadings r arguments, memorandums.

So I'll try to rule on this as quick as I can.

That depends on

whether I start feeling better than I do now.
MR. BOOKE: If you survive,
THE COURT: Yeah, maybe that's an even better question.
MR. HITT: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. BOOKE: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you for your patience, all of you.
MR. HITT: Appreciate your time.

Get some rest.

COURT CLERK: (Inaudible).
THE COURT: Pardon me?
COURT CLERK: (Inaudible) back on the phone.
THE COURT: Pardon?

Oh, Mr. Zaccheo, are you back on

the phone?
MR. ZACCHEO: Yes, your Honor, I've been here for
nearly the entire hearing, and I thank you for allowing me to
attend this way.
THE COURT: At this point m
set any new dates or anything.

time we're not prepared to

So I guess we'll just let it go

until I make some sort of a ruling.
MR. ZACCHEO: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
(Hearing concluded)
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on September 23, 2005}

3

COURT BAILIFF: Seventh District Court, Carbon County,

4

Stare of Utah is now in session.

5

Kalliday presiding.

6

The Honorable Judge Bruce K.

THE COURT: Please be seated.

7

lateness.

8

—

9

So I took a couple of extra minutes.

I had a telephone conference that I had to leave

make sure that the minute entries reflected what we did.

10

Essex, et al, Ettex, et al.

11

themselves for the record, please.

12
13

I apologize for my

This is the Kloepfer vs.

I'll ask the parties to identify

MR. BOOKE: Thank you.

Good morning, your Honor.

Brad

Booke and Robert Strieper for the Dimick family plaintiffs.

14

THE COURT: Thank you.

15

MR. HITT: Good morning, your Honor.

Justin Kitt and

16

Scott Christensen for the OC Liquidation Trust, successor in

17

the interest of the Oakwood defendants.

18

THE COURT: Thank you.

19

MR. BOOKE: Nothing, your Honor.

20

THE COURT: Where do we start?

21

Preliminary matters?

Who gots to jump right

up?

22

MR. BOOKE: Well, it's

23

THE COURT: Mr. Booke.

24

MR. BOOKE: Your Honor, it's the plaintiffs objections

25

—

to the proposed order proposed by defendant Oakwood on the

—
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1

on its summary judgment motion, and then -on the Court's order.

2

To begin, just to give a short, very short bit of

3

factual context so that our specific objections make sense,

4

there are two sets of —

5

case.

6

Oakwood defendants here today; and then the other category

7

is the owner/operator of the sales lot where the home sat.

8
9

or categories of defendants in the

There is the manufacturer of the home, which is the

In that second category there are two defendants
there, because the lot —

the business was sold spanning the

10

period of time that these events occurred.

11

manufacturer defendant.

12

owner operator set of defendants.

So there's a

Then there's sort of a sales lot and

In that context, again very briefly, on March 11th of

13
14

2000, Chris Dimick, who is then living in Nevada, comes over to

15

Helper to look at homes because he is moving back to the Price

16

area.

17

lot, and look through a home that is sitting on the sales lot.

18

Chris Dimick and Cathy Dimick go to this lot, meet up

In looking at one of the homes, they pull open a

19

closet door, see a dust ball of some sort in the closet door.

20

Chris Dimick kicks it.

21

some mouse droppings.

22

of it at the moment, decide that home and leave.

23

goes back in the back.

24
25

Turns out that it's a mouse nest and
They don't think anything in particular
Chris Dimick

Cathy Dimick goes home.

Fast forward then 76 days, I think, to May 27-\ 2000.
Cathy Dimick becomes violently ill, is life flighted out, and

_41

dies within 48 —

2

illness.

3

ill, is life flighted out.

4

disabled.

5

haunta virus exposure.

6

60 hours of the onset of violent flu-like

May 30th of 2000, Chris Dimick also becomes violently
He survives, bur is permanently

The diagnosis of both of them —

for both of them is

She dies; he survives.

At summary judgment the Court asked whether you needed

7

to address the issue of whether this specific exposure caused

8

the specific haunta virus from which Cathy died and Chris

9

became ill.

The parties agreed that you did not at that time

10

—

because that was not the nature of the summary judgment

11

motion.

12

was no manufacturing defect.

13

of whether that specific exposure caused the death and illness.

14

Just so the Court will know, however, there is a known

The contention by the Oakwood defendant was that there
So we didnrt even reach the issue

15

incubation period for haunta virus from —

16

days from the time of exposure until the onset of symptoms.

17

Our evidence will be that the only time that Chris Dimick and

18

Cathy Dimick were together in the same place at the same time

19

during that incubation period was in that mobile home on the

20

Happy Homes lots.

21

the issue at the time of the summary judgment hearing.

22

and it's 75 to 90

So we will make that proof, but that was not

Rather, the summary judgment hearing concerned simply

23

the —

whether there was a defect in the home.

24

manufactured in Kansas.

25

halves over the highway to —

The home is

It is trucked in two parts or two
placed on the lot in Helper.

-51

The open sides of the rwo halves of the home during transit: are

2

covered in plastic, and the underside is covered in plastic.

3

Then they're sat on the lot, not connected to one -another, but

4

set close to one another; as close as they can get them, but

5

they're not attached to one another.

6

As they are sitting there, as manufactured, the home

7

has 30 to 50 penetrations in it in the exterior walls and in

8

the flooring for purposes of connecting utilities, electric and

9

plumbing, that would be stubbed out on the foundation where the

10

home would ultimately be sat when it was sold.

11

are not —

12

in any way.

Those openings

the openings themselves are not plugged or covered

13

Now, it was a disputed fact, according to the summary

14

judgment pleadings whether and how completely those holes were

15

covered, as the home sat on the lot. The defendant manufacturer

16

moved for summary judgment on that basis, alleging that there

17

was no defect.

18

represent a defect, because they are not plugged.

19

We disagreed.

We argued that those holes

The Court granted that motion, nonetheless; and that

20

being the state of the record, it comes to the delivery and the

21

signature of an order that reflects what the summary judgment

22

was about.

23

The important consideration —

I think that the most

24

important consideration from my point of view as to the breadth

25

of the summary judgment order is that we still have all of our
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1

claims pending against the two sets of owner/operators of the

2

lot.

3

So the problems, then, are twofold.

Number one, is

4

making this a final order under 54 (b) so that we in essence

5

have to take an appeal now, while the balance of the case is

6

still pending, ending up in a piecemeal litigation of sorts,

7

because —

8

the Court's conclusion about —

9

is one problem; which is that we now end up having the case or

I mean, with all respect, candidly we disagree with
on rhe defect issue.

So that

10

litigating the case in two separate directions at the same

11

time.

12

The second problem is the breadth of the language

13

contained in the findings of fact and the conclusions that

14

were prepared by defendant Oakwood, because it is my belief

15

as we have set forth specifically in our objections that those

16

findings of fact and conclusions affect the remaining claims

17

against the —

18

actively defendants in this case.

against the two defendants who are still

19

Those defendants may —

although we don't know,

20

because we haven't reached that point —

21

those findings of fact or conclusions, even though they

22

didn't litigate those issues, as a defense, when in fact those

23

findings legally do not accurately represent what is necessary

24

for the Court to grant summary judgment on the products theory.

25

In other words, it is over broad; and they're going to

attempt to assert
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—

2

that the other defendants would attempt to assert more than

3

what they should be able to based on summary judgment on the

4

products theory.

5

my concern is that they will attempt to assert more than

—

Now, a solution to the problem is to not grant 54(b)

6

certification so that we do not have to litigate the two cases

7

separately from one another; and to somehow fashion the order

8

so that neither of the remaining defendants can assert sort of

9

the law of the case or a fact of the case defense, to be able

10

to assert the Oakwood order as against the plaintiffs in the

11

remaining claims.

12

That is sort of the short solution to the problem; and

13

I would offer that to all concerned as a means of just quickly

14

resolving it.

15

point of view is to simply go through the findings one at a

16

time, and state our objections and argue those objections to

17

you so that the specific final content of that order is what

18

is actually supported by the record and by the facts in the

19

record, as opposed to what we believe it -- it is right now.

20

Failing that, what we really need to do from our

Before I move onto that, perhaps, if the Court wishes,

21

we could address that approach, because I don't know that that

22

affects this defendant.

23

this defendant; but the second part of what I've proposed I

24

don't think really does affect the Oakwood defendant.

25

Well, the 54(b) part of it affects

THE COURT: Do you want to respond to that part of

1

this argument?

2

MR. HITT: Yes, your Honor, I do.

Interestingly

3

enough, the underlying facts that were deemed undisputed in

4

this matter were largely taken from request for admission and

5

interrogatories that were submitted to the owner/operator.

6

owner/operator actually responded to those, and provided us the

7

basis for our motion for summary judgment.

The

So to the extent that Counsel is saying that these
9

owner/operator defendants would be bound by the findings and

10

fact and conclusions of law, and rely on that, well, they're

11

already bound by that; because if you look at our memoranda,

12

the undisputed facts are taken from their own admissions.

13

they would be bound by those in the underlying litigation

14

anyway.

15

So

It seems to me that we're just sort of arguing and

16

attempt —

17

summary judgment, which would be inappropriate here.

18

essentially —

19

proposed order, and not the effect that order is going to have

20

on the remaining defendants; because the fact that there are

21

remaining defendants is a consequence of plaintiff's decision

22

to sue multiple parties in this one action.

23

THE COURT: Address his —

24
25

the 54(b).

rearguing the underlying grant of the motion for
We're

we should just be limiting our argument to the

the certification aspect of

I don't think that that was ever discussed.

MR. HITT: It was not argued in the

—

-91 I

MR. BOOKE: You're right, your Honor.

At the summary

2

judgment hearing we didn't —

when the Court took it under

3

advisement, you know, we didn't request that the order be

4

certified as final at chat point.

That's why in our

proposed

5 J order we put that certification, leaving it to the Judge' s
discretion whether or not to certify it as final.
7 |

Pursuant to Rule 54(b), the Judge does have discretion

8

to certify a judgment as final for appeal when there's no just

9

reason for delay.

There are three conditions that must be met

10

under that/ and it goes back to the seminal case of Pate vs.

11

Marathon.

12

The first requirement —

the first requirement is that

13

there must be multiple claims for relief and multiple parties

14

to the action.

15

the Oakwood defendants represent an independent party, separate

16

and apart from the owner/operators .

17

We have multiple parties here; and you know,

The second, the judgment must be appealable but for

18

the fact that there are other parties.

19

parties here, your judgment granting our motion for summary

20

judgment would be appealable, because the claim would be, you

21

know, fully dissolved against this party.

22

If there weren't other

Then the third requirement is that there —

that the

23

Judge must determine that there's no just cause for delay.

24

There's no just cause for delay here.

25

been dissolved against the defendants Oakwood pursuant to your

All the claims have

-101 I memorandum decision.
2

As we spoke with the Court about in the telephone

3

conference on that September 12^b, Oakwood —

4

defendants have gone through bankruptcy.

5

their assets are now being distributed by the OAC Liquidation

6

Trust, and these assets are being distributed through a

7 J bankruptcy proceeding in Delaware.

the Oakwood

They are now

—

This claim is one of the

single largest claims that that bankruptcy Court is having to
9 I deal with.
10

So while Counsel's argument that there's no just

11

reason for piecemeal litigationr we submit that there is,

12

because the claims here have been resolved; and it is going

13

to be incumbent upon the Oakwood defendants and the OAC

14

Liquidation Trust to go back to the bankruptcy Court and show

15

them that this action is fully resolved here.

16

for our request of 54(b) certification.

That's the basis

17

THE COURT: The second prong, tell me that again.

18

MR. BOOKE: The second prong is that but for the

19

presence of other parties, the order would be immediately

20

appealable and what —

21

a counterclaim pending against the plaintiff or a cross claim

22

that hasn't been decided on.

23

parties have been decided.

24
25

and that's essentially that there isn't

It's all the claims between the

THE COURT: Well, I think that their response would
suggest that we're going to have to go to the second step in

-11That is, to look at the individual object ions

1

your suggests.on.

2

and the individual findings.

3
4

MR. BOOKE : All right

On —

Thank you, your Honor.

to respond on the .54 (b) point, •chough, the Court

—

5

THE COURT : Yeah, and I'm not ruling on rhat yet.

6

MR. BOOKE : I understand.

As to those t:hree prongs

7 ; rhat multiple claims and multiple parties, certsdnly true.

As

8

to whether rhis is appealable absent the existence of the o ther

9

parties, I disagree with that point; because there were five

10

causes of action alleged against the Oakwood defendant.

11

Their motion for summary judgment raised only the

12

products liability theory.

13

in our opposition, and in their reply brief for the first rime

14

they argued, *xOh, well, it doesn'r make any difference.

15

all the same."

16

cannot assert something for the first time in rhe reply brief.

17

So we would disagree on that point.

18

We pointed that out to the Court

Utah law is clearly to the contrary.

On the third issue —

It's

You

third element, the just cause

19

point, I mean, piecemeal litigation really is the key to that;

20

but the fact is that the Oakwood defendant and its liquidation

21

trust and whomever is involved in that has done whatever

22

they've done, knowing full well that this is still a pending

23

matter.

24

at their own peril.

That said, I mean, we think that the 54(b)

25

certification had —

just has the effect of making two lawsuirs

So I'd respectfully suggest they took those actions
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out of one*

2

Moving onto the specific findings of face, finding of

3

fact No. 3 says that on June 24th, 1998 the home is inspected by

4

the United States Government and certified by the United States

5

Government.

6

There is no evidence in the record of thar fact.

7

there is is a form called the "HUD checklist."

8

through a HUD checklist and checked off four pages worth of

9

stuff; but there is no evidence before your Honor that that

10

was a government inspector that did that.

11

there was any government approval of that —

12

approval of that particular home.

13

With respect to

14

THE COURT: Doesn't —

15

What

Somebody went

No evidence that
or inspection or

—
doesn't the business record that

was submitted do that?

16

MR. BOOKE: I think not.

17

THE COURT: Isn't that a business record?

18

MR. BOOKE: Well, I've got it right here, your Honor.

19

It says —

it's called a "HUD Compliance Assurance Inspection

20

Form."

21

of the document or suggests —

22

covering affidavit or anything like that that says that that's

23

a government form.

Now, there is nothing whatsoever that shows on the face
nor is there any testimony or

24

MR. HITT: Your Honor, I have to object here.

25

THE COURT: I think —

I think there was. I think there

-131

was testimony "Do the effect that that' s exactly what that was .

2

MR. HITT: And the issue here, your Honor, Mr. Booke's

3

going too far, because he did not dispute any of these in his

4

underlying memorandum.

5

first time after the judgment has already been rendered.

6

had the opportunity to attack the HUD form in whatever manner

7

he chose in his opposition to our motion.

8

the pleadings, you'll see he didn't do that.

9

He's raising these disputes for the

MR. BOOKE: Your Honor, I

He

If you'll look at

—

10

THE COURT: Well, in his objections to the findings of

11

fact, paragraph 3, he says, ^There's no evidence in the record

12

that the home met government standards . "

13
14

MR. BOOKE: There is, your Honor, because the HUD, the
HUD checklist was attached.

15

THE COURT: We were just talking about, right.

16

MR. BOOKE: Right.

17

MR. HITT: Right.

18

THE COURT: And again, my recollection, and honestly I

19

can't remember that far back.

20

have come in between, but my recollection was that there was

21

testimony as to

22
23

There's too many things that

what that was, why it was —

MR. HITT: There's none.
respect

you're saying no?

There is a form; and I would

—

24

THE COURT: That was admitted?

25

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes.
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MR. KITT: Yes, and I would respectfully submit

2

thai on its face it does not appear to be a United States

3

Government anything.

4

certified by anybody anything.

5

document prepared by the manufacturer when somebody goes

6

through a checklist.

7
8

Does not contain —

appear to be a

I think it is an in-house

MR. BOOKE: And your Honor, that's an interesting
allegation he's making.

9

However, he cannot raise

—

THE COURT: And I'm going to say that my recollection

10

is to the contrary.

11

on appeal and determine whether it was or wasn't there.

12

recollection is to the contrary uhers.

13

finding 4?

14

So I guess you'll have to dig it out
My

Where is your next one;

MR. BOOKE: No. 4, your Honor, the —

No. 4 is a

15

disputed fact, and it is disputed in the record.

16

of that argument is that they paid for it when they bought it.

17

The other side of that argument, there is specific testimony

18

from the employees of the owner/operator that the payment for

19

the home does not occur until the ultimate purchaser does the

20

closing.

21

lot for sale, it is a consignment sort of situation.

22

conflicting testimony on that point.

23

One side

That is when title passes; and that as it sits on the
There is

MR. HITT: Again, your Honor, I'm going to object.

24

It did not —

25

memorandum.

this fact is taken directly from our initial
Mr. Booke did not dispute that in his opposition.

-15He's raising it for the first time in this hearing (inaudible).
2 I

THE COURT: Gentlemen, do you know what I did when I

3

did this thing, and got me into this mess?

I went and I looked

4

at the objections.

5

and I went down each one of them, and said,

6

that's in there, that's in there;" and I did it.

I.went and looked at the proposed findings;
xx

That' s in there,
I signed it

7 J Without seeing your request for oral argument; and that's what
got me into this —
9 1

this little thing.

So I have gone through these things, and I'm willing

10

to go through them again if it's going to be of any help; but

11

I'm having to say that the findings that I reviewed at the rime

12

that I reviewed them reflected exactly what I thought that I

13

had done.

14

MR. HITT: Well, and I understand the Court's dilemma.

15

I guess it's one kind of a problem for the plaintiff if there's

16

a 54(b) certification.

17

THE COURT: Yeah.

18

MR. HITT: It's another kind of a problem if there's

19

not, because statistically I guess the odds are that ultimately

20

we resolve the case with the other defendants, and it probably

21

never ends up on appeal if we don't have a 54(b) certification.

22

If we do have one, then we don't have any alternative but to

23

file an appeal now, and then the accuracy of all of these, and

24

you know, does in fact become a disputed problem.

25

So perhaps, then, in that context the solution is

-161 I to deny the 54 (b) certification, deny the balance of our
2

objections; and then we go from there.

3

THE COURT: And confer to my judgment?

4

MR. HITT: Yeah, and then we go from there.

If we

5

resolve the case with the other defendants, end of story.

6

never becomes a problem.

7

It

We have, just for the Court's information just this

8

past week conducted a scheduling conference with the other

9

defendants, and we now have scheduled out the balance of the

10

case.

So

—

11

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, if I may respond to the

12

54(b), Mr. Booke is essentially asking for this Court to hold

13

the Oakwood defendants hostage while his action proceeds

14

against the other defendants.

15

inappropriate here.

16

We'd submit that that's

We request that this Rule 54(b) certification in our

17

proposed order.

The Court considered that with due care; and

IB

the Judge —

19

hasn't identified any palpable prejudice that his client would

20

suffer as a result of this matter being certified as final.

and your"Honor signed that order.

Mr. Booke

21

They have the opportunity to take this up on appeal

22

and have his objections to the order considered and make his

23

arguments there.

24

by the rules here.

25

of situation, where all claims are disposed of against one

You know, we've got to —

we've got to play

Rule 54(b) provides for precisely this kind
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party, and a plaintiff can still proceed against the other

2

parties.

3

We'd submit that the 54(b) justification is warranted

4

here based on the extenuating circumstances of the bankruptcy

5

proceedings, actions that have already been taken based on the

6

initial signing of the final judgment; and clearly the lack of

7

prejudice to the plaintiff should be considered.

8

MR. BOOKE: Your Honor, you know, I listened to the

9

defendant argue about what we didn't raise in our opposition to

10

summary judgment motion, and that we need to play by the rules.

11

Well, that's a two-way street.

12

They didn't seek 54(b) certification at any time until

13

they submitted an order to your Honor; never argued that; never

14

presented that.

15

The first chance that we had to deal with it and to address it

16

was in the objections to the order, and we immediately did so.

17

It was never in paper.

It was never oral.

There clearly is palpable prejudice.

One part of

18

the prejudice is that if the other defendants attempt to assert

19

it as a sword or a shield against us in the balance of the

20

litigation.

21

now.

22

results.

The other is that we've got to litigate two cases

So there is —

you know, there is indeed prejudice that

23

MR. HITT: Again, your Honor

24

THE COURT: One last

25

MR, CHRISTENSEN: —

—

—
with respect to the sword and

-181 I shield to the other defendants, I j.ust remind the Court
2

that the sword and shield was actually created by the other

3

defendants, the owner/operator.

4

there were no problems with the home when they received it.

5

They're the ones that admitted they were in and out of the

6

house.

7

They're the ones that admitted

They never saw, you know, mice or anything like that.
They're going to be the ones that are bound by their

8

previous admissions; because as this Court knows, it's very

9

difficult to retract any admission to a request for admission.

10

So they're going to be bound by those.

11

MR. HITT: Your Honor, I apologize.

12

specific thought on that?

13

—

14

admitted; but that is not how they —

15

in the order.

16

and defective conditions.

17

are not facts.

May I just one

Facts are one thing.

They're stuck

the other defendants are stuck with whatever facts they
those things are couched

In the order they're couched in terms of defects
Those are legal conclusions.

Those

18

That is, when two defendants, two codefendants serve

19

one another in discovery; and one defendant says to the other

20

defendant,

21

our product?" and the other defendants says, ^xNo, we don't

22

think there's anything wrong with your product," you know,

23

that kind of discovery should not give rise to binding facts

24

that affect the future of the claims when only one party has

25

sought relief.

xx

Hey, did you think there was anything wrong with

Those are the, quote,

AX

facts" that Counsel is

-191

referring to.

That's apparent from their moving papers.

2

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor.

3

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

4

MR. CHRISTENSEN: If I may, I have two representatives

5

of the OC Liquidation Trust here that flew in from out of stare

6

to attend this hearing.

7

hearing from them with respect to rhe proceedings in the

8

bankruptcy Court that have been taken, they're available.

9

If the Court has any interest in

THE COURT: Thank you.

Respond, if you will, to the

10

allegations by plaintiff that the motion for summary judgment

11

was only as "co one claim, as opposed to all claims.

12

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, prior to our filing our

13

motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs had filed two

14

complaints; filed one complaint, then they filed an amended

15

complaint.

16

Our motion is based on the second amended complaint.

17

Eventually there was a second amended complaint.

In that second amended complaint, plaintiff's Counsel

18

alleged various allegations against the multiple defendants.

19

They don't parse the —

20

They just say, "All defendants this, all defendants that."

21

specify who they're pleading against.

In going through those actual pleadings, we were left,

22

as defendants, to determine which of those causes of action

23

were they asserting against us, now set forth in our initial

24

memorandum.

25

that only the products liability and perhaps the breach of

From their second amended complaint, it appeared
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implied warranty were being asserted against the Oakwood

2

defendants.

3

So we addressed those in our memorandum.

In reply, plaintiffs argued that no, there were other

4

causes of action that were being argued.

5

brief we argued why each of those causes of actions that they

6

are allegedly asserting against Oakwood don't really apply, and

7

we've specified those allegations.

8
9

In turn, in our reply

In oral argument Mr. Booke argued that there was
actually a third amended complaint that was at issue.

Now, I

10

pulled the Court's docket, and in April or 2004 plaintiff's

11

Counsel filed a request for leave to file a third amended

12

complaint.

13

They didn't serve that motion for leave to either

14

- - t o any of the defendants.

Once the —

and the Court did

15

grant that motion; but that third amended complaint was never

16

served on any defendant.

17

here to show that.

No defendant filed an answer to a third

18

amended complaint.

There's no service -- proof of service of a

19

third amended complaint.

I have the Court's docket printed out

20

So we're stuck, for purposes of our motion, with the

21

second amended complaint; and that's what we addressed in our

22

motion.

23

causes of action.

24

as alleged, in the second amended complaint in all of our

25

pleadings.

That's why there's this disagreement over the five
Those five causes of action were addressed,
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THE COURT: Do you remember at oral argument any

2

discussion about those claims, and that we were really only

3

focusing on the limited

4

—

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Right, the (inaudible), your Honor,

5

no.

At oral argument we —

it was our position that ail five

6

causes of action had been addressed in our pleadings; and

7

they were at issue for oral argument.

8

when Mr. Booke argued for the first time rhe third amended

9

complaint.

Mr. Booke —

that's

That's what prompted me to go back in the record

10

and see if there even was a third amended complaint, which I

11

didn't receive a copy of.

12

Specifically I would direct the Court to our reply

13

memorandum in support of summary judgment, where we raise

14

those causes of action.

15

plaintiff's Counsel had the opportunity to request additional

16

briefing on that to respond to those contentions; but he

17

didn't.

We show why they didn't apply; and

He left it for oral argument.

18

Also, in the first brief, in discussing the Utah Code

19

Annotated Section 7 8-15-6, which is the rebuttable presumption

20

of a defect; or if a house is in conformance with government

21

status, and there's —

22

no defect, and it's up to plaintiffs to rebut that.

23

that we said that —

24
25

or product, and there's no —

presumably
In doing

specifically quoting from my brief:

"In order to prevail under a products liability,
breach of express or implied warranty or negligence theory
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against Oakwood, plaintiffs must provide some evidence of a

2

manufacturing defect in a home."

3

that evidence, it was our contention that all of their claims

4

fail as to Oakwood.

Because they didn't provide

5

THE COURT: Did you want to respond?

You started to.

6

MR. BOOKE: Yes, and I apologize if I was interrupting.

7

That's just

8

complaint alleges causes of action, five of them, in which the

9

defendants, plural, and there isn't anything whatsoever that

10

not the state of the record.

The second amended

narrows that.

11

Now, the third amended complaint also does that.

It

12

doesn't make any difference, I don't think, because in that

13

respect they're both the same.

14

order allowing leave to file the amended com —

15

complaint; and it is signed.

16

complaint attached as Exhibit 1 is deemed filed May 3rd, 2004."

17

I'm not sure about the service.

18

I'm not in a position to dispute what Counsel says.

19

There was a motion for an
third amended

It says, "The third amended

"We show service, but you know,

However, when Oakwood's summary judgment motion was

20

filed, on page 1 of the opposition I specifically noted, "The

21

motion should be styled a motion for partial summary judgment

22

because it seeks judgment only on the strict products liability

23

theory."

24

the summary judgment motion because that is in the entirety of

25

the summary judgment motion all that is referred to.

I said that specifically in my initial opposition to

Those
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other causes of action are never even referenced.

2

I would specifically call the Court's attention L O

3

page 4 of the motion, "Plaintiffs do not poinr to a specific

4

manufacturing defect that allowed mice to enter the home."

5

Lower on page 4, "No evidence that a defect in the home

6

allowed

7
8
9

THE COURT: Are you r e f e r r i n g t o your p l e a d i n g or t o
theirs?
MR. BOOKE: I was first referring to my pleading, page

10

2, the footnote.

11

not the objection, your Honor.

12

summary judgment motion where I at that time specifically

13

pointed out that the summary judgment motion addressed only

14

the products liability theory of liability.

15

the reply brief, where they said, "Oh, it doesn't matter.

16

They're all the same.''

17

There's a full paragraph foornote.

This is

This is my opposition to uheir

It is not until

That is contrary to specific Utah law that I did argue

18

at the time of the summary judgment hearing.

19

and is Brown vs. Glover at 16 P.3d 540 2000 Utah 89.

20

"Issues in a reply brief not presented in the opening brief are

21

considered waived and will not be considered."

22

The case was nhen
It says,

Their summary judgment motion says what ±z says.

I

23

pointed out that they didn't argue the other four theories in

24

their summary judgment motion; and they addressed them for the

25

first time in their reply brief.

So that's the state of the
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record.

I mean, people can argue whatever intentions nhey may

2

wish, but that is the state of the record, your Honor.

3

THE COURT: Thank you.

4

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, if I may, we are bound by

5

our pleadings; and Oakwood will be bound by its pleadings.

6

direct the Court to our initial memorandum.., page 8, subsection

7

(a), where we state —

8

when we say, "In order to prevail under a products liability,

9

breach of express or implied warranty or a negligence theory

where we reference all five claims and

10

against Oakwood, plaintiffs must provide evidence of a

11

manufacturing defect in the home.7'

12

I'd

That's because Utah Code Annotated 78-15-6 reads, "In

13

any action for damages for personal injury, debt or property

14

damage allegedly caused by a defect in a product, you have to

15

show that the product is — " it says, "No product shall be

16

considered to have a defect if it's in accordance with

17

government standards."

18

So, you know, I think we're getting a little off

19

topic here.

20

briefed.

21

order as presented does adequately address all of the issues.

22

Everything's in the pleadings.

The issues were

The issues were argued at oral argument; and the

MR. BOOKE: Your Honor, it's nice to pick a little

23

snippet from something.

Then you go over to page 12 and it

24

says, "The facts of this case must be contrasted with other

25

Utah products liability cases."

I mean, honestly, I don't
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1

think you can read this motion in its entirety and think that

2

it's about anything but a products liability theory.

3

what it is.

4

THE COURT: Well, I may be wrong.

It is

I've been wrong

5

before, but I'm going to confirm the order that I signed; and

6

I'm going to confirm it as a certified order of final judgment.

7

So you're going to have to take your appeal appropriately under

8

those circumstances.

9

signed the order.

10

and I'll sign it.

I think that's all I need to do.

I've

You can prepare another order if you want to

11

MR. BOOKE: Your Honor

12

THE COURT: I guess I'll sign it; I'll have to do that.

13

MR. BOOKE

14

THE COURT* So that the date

15

MR. BOOKE: Correct.

16

THE COURT: —

17

MR. BOOKE: Right.

18

Yes.

—

Thank you.
—

that the date complies.
So uhe order, is that effective

today?

19

THE COURT: Today.

20

MR. HITT: And I have one, your Honor, ready for

21

j

signature now.

22

THE COURT: Have you seen that?

23

MR. BOOKE: I have not.

24

THE COURT: Why don't you —

1

25

MR. HITT: It's verbatim of the —

1
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THE COURT: Of the other one?

2

MR. HITT: It's just (inaudible).

3

MR. BOOKE: I*11 trust Counsel's representation.

4

THE COURT: Thank you.

Bring it forward and I'll sign

5

it.

You know, it makes it awfully hard for me when you guys

6

come and you're prepared like this; but I do appreciate it.

7

you want me to ask Mr. Booke if he'll sign?

8

MR. HITT: (Inaudible).

9

MR. BOOKE: I'm not waiving my

10
11

—

THE COURT: No, no, you're not waiving anything.

MR. HITT: It does say as to form only, so

13

THE COURT: Right.

14

MR. HITT: No/ it doesn't say ^form only."

16
17
18
19

It

just appears to reflect the judgment of this Court.

12

15

Do

—

It says

*form."
MR. BOOKE: Your Honor, would it be possible to obtain
a conformed copy of this today?
THE COURT: Yeah, I'll have my clerk take the files
out, and she'll make a conformed copy right this minute.

20

MR. BOOKE: Thank you, your Honor.

21

MR. HITT: Thank you.

22

THE COURT: Thank you all.

23

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you, your Honor.

24

THE COURT: We'll be adjournment.

25

(Hearing concluded)
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